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Discrimination Against Women in Employment
in Higher Education
Alan Miles Ruben* and Betty J. Willis**
As an institution, ... [the university] looks far into the past and far
into the future, and is often at odds with the present. It serves so-
ciety almost slavishly-a society it also criticizes, sometimes unmer-
cifully. Devoted to equality of opportunity, it is itself a class society.
-Clark Kerr, THE USES OF THE UNIVERSITY 19 (1963).
A T THE SUMMIT Of the social system, like some multi-nucleated hypo-
thalamus, the institutions of higher learning exert pervasive and
decisive influence on the direction and rate of change which we are
pleased to call progress. It is the universities, particularly the profes-
sional schools, which serve as the vehicles for upward social mobility.
Yet for all their reformist influence upon the general fabric of our era
educators have directed predictably little critical examination at the
universities' own internal affairs. Colleges are no exception to the maxim
that all institutions tend to be defensive about their own practices how-
ever laggard behind the policies they publicly promote.
Having been forced to adjust the structure of academic governance
and the design of the curriculum responsively to large-scale student pro-
test, it now appears that universities will have to rework their tradi-
tional patterns for the appointment, compensation and promotion of
faculty and administrative staff to satisfy the demands being made by
the women's liberation movement for an end to sexist employment
practices.
Today, the four women in ten who seek vocational outlets for their
talents in lieu of an all-encompassing family life (some 29 million in
1968) constitute more than 37 percent of the labor force. Most are skill-
fully manipulated, however, into "acceptable" careers chiefly as clerks,
and, at a higher level, as school teachers and nurses.1 Barriers in the
form of admission quotas, denial of scholarship aid and the lack of pro-
fessional women with whom to identify reinforce the socially blessed
dogma that "women's place is in the home" and so operate to discourage
women from other careers requiring a graduate degree.
2
The interplay of these psychological and social forces have resulted
in a pronounced disparity in educational attainment between the sexes.
In 1967 only 50 percent of girls graduating from high school enrolled at
*Associate Professor of Law, Cleveland State University College of Law.
** J.D., Geo. Wash. U.; M.B.A., U. of Penn.
5 1969 HANDBOOK ON WOMEN WORKERS, Bulletin 294, Women's Bureau, U.S. Dept. of
Labor (1969) pp. 9-10, 94-100, 116. [hereinafter referred to as HANDBooK-1969.]
2 Weisstein, "Kinder, Kuche, Kirche" as Scientific Law: Psychology Constructs the
Female, printed in Hearings on Section 805 of H.R. 16098 Before the Special Sub-
comm. on Education of the Committee on Education and Labor, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess.,
Part I, at 286-292 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as "Hearings, Part I"].
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a college in contrast to 71 percent of their male classmates.3 While it is
true that more women are earning college degrees than ever before, the
disparity between the sexes has been widening. In 1940, 3.7 percent of
women and 5.4 percent of men, age 25 and over, had completed a four
year college education. By 1967 the respective statistics were 7.6 percent
for women and 12.8 percent for men.4
The influence of these pressures persist in graduate education. In
programs beyond the baccalaureate degree in 1967 only 30 percent of
the 900,000 students registered were female.5 At the doctorate level-
the prime market from which college faculty are recruited-only 12 per-
cent of the degrees conferred in 1967 were earned by women; a decrease
of 3 percent from the proportion achieved in 1930.0
The pattern emerging from these statistics shows undeniably an ever
declining proportion of women represented at each step of the educa-
tional pyramid.
Not only have women been under-represented in higher education
but their courses of study have been concentrated within a narrow range.
Thirty eight percent of the bachelor's degrees awarded to women in 1967
were in education, accounting for 75 percent of all such degrees conferred
in this field. In contrast less than 3 percent of the first degrees earned by
women were in business and commerce.
7
Turning to professional education, the status of women is even more
starkly limited. Women held only 7 percent of the first professional de-
grees in medicine awarded in 1967 and less than 4 percent of those con-
ferred in law.8
The net effect of the "sex gap" in higher education has been to re-
strict both the number of women qualified to serve on university faculty
and staff and their areas of vocational competence. Yet, even so, the
number, rank, and compensation of females actually employed in higher
education have been so significantly less than expected as to warrant the
conclusion of widespread, deliberate discrimination."a
Rarely are the charges of calculated anti-female bias in higher edu-
cation which are levelled by women's groups supported by reference to
written personnel policies or testimony as to instructions given by univer-
sity officials. Nor is it seriously contended that there exists some great
silent college conspiracy to deny women equal faculty opportunities.
3 Osofsky and Feldman, Fact Sheet on Women (1971), printed in Hearings, Part I,
at 129-130.
4 id.
5 HARzwooK-1969 at 190.
6 Id. at 191.
7 Id. at 193-94.
s Id. at 195.
8a See, A MATTER OF SIMPLE JUSTICE, THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON
WOMEN'S RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES (1970) (Reprinted in Hearings, Part I, at 37-41),
F. Newman, Ch., REPORT ON HIGHER EDUCATION, April 1, 1971 (unpublished).
The professional woman seeks employment until normal retirement age. 71 per-
cent of all women with 5 years or more of college are in the labor force and par-
ticipation is almost as strong for married professionals as for those without husbands.
HANDROOK-1969 at 205-206.
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Rather it is suggested that prejudice against the female scholar or ad-
ministrator prevails as a result of deep-seated feelings about the role of
women in society and the propriety of their competing with males for the
sought after positions held by male members of faculty peer groups
which powerfully affect, if not control, the employment relationship.
That such influences are effectively at work appears from a statistical
analysis of the employment posture of women at colleges and universities.
In 1964 only 22 percent of the faculty and professional staff in insti-
tutions of higher learning were women. Rather than progress this sta-
tistic signifies a decline in the proportion of females among college
teachers. One must go back to 1910 before women can be shown to have
accounted for so small a segment of the academic profession.9
Not only are qualified women not employed proportionately to their
number in academia, but those who are appointed tend to be found pri-
marily in the lowest professional ranks. As may be observed from the
following table, 0 drawn from experience at twenty universities, women
are habitually used as cheap, transient labor in the untenured ranks of
instructor and assistant professor and are almost invisible in the profes-
sorial rank.





The scarcity of women generally on university faculties and the
concentration of those so employed in the lower tier of positions is
accompanied, the same study demonstrates, by their confinement, in the
main, to the departments of education and home economics 1 as shown
in the following table:
Percent of Women







Under-representation of women is perhaps most pronounced on
boards of trustees and in policy-level administrative positions in the co-
educational collegiate hierarchy where, according to a member of the
9 Id. at 98. In 1940 women held 28% of faculty posts in higher education. Id.
10 Based on 1960 data compiled from employment records of 20 leading universities
by Dr. Jessie Bernard and reported in BERNARD, AcADEMIC WOMEN, 190-191 (1966).
The broader study of the National Education Association for 1965-66, cited note 13
infra, also supports this conclusion. See also, Women's Bureau, U. S. Dept. of Labor,
Fact Sheet on the Earnings Gap, at 1 (1970).
11 Id. at Table 10/1.
20 CLEV. ST. L. R. (3) Sept. 1971474
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Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission, they are "virtually non-
existent." "L With the merger of the traditional post of Dean of Women
into the newly created position of Dean of Student Affairs on campuses
across the country opportunities for women in administration are being
further curtailed.
Hand in hand with the limitation of the university employment mar-
ket for females is the underpayment of their salaries. The National Edu-
cation Association reports that at every level the annual compensation of
women is less than that of men of equal rank and experience.
MEDIAN ANNUAL SALARIES OF TEACHING STAFF IN COLLEGES
AND UNIVERSITIES, BY SEX, 1965-6613
Number Median Annual Salary
Teaching staff Women Men Women Men
Professors 3,149 32,873 11,649 12,768
Associate professors 5,148 28,892 9,322 10,064
Assistant professors 8,983 37,232 7,870 8,446
Instructors 9,454 19,644 6,454 6,864
Total 26,734 118,641 $ 7,732 $ 9,275
The message of these aggregate statistics can perhaps best be under-
stood when personalized for individual institutions. Ohio boasts one of
the nation's 10 largest private universities, as measured by value of en-
dowment, Case Western Reserve University, and one of the 10 largest
public universities, from the standpoint of enrollment, Ohio State
University.
14
Case Western Reserve University exemplifies the gloomy picture for
women with only three women trustees out of fifty (none on the govern-
ing body, the Executive Committee), less than 14 percent of the total
faculty female, only 8 percent of the female faculty holding a rank above
assistant professor, and with just three women administrators out of
thirty eight (not one in a policy-making position). Additionally, there
are presently no females on either the engineering school or the law
faculties, only one female instructor on the school of management faculty,
only one female professor in the medical school, and only ten female
professors in the department of arts & sciences, at least half of whom
were hired originally to teach at Mather College for Women. In point
of fact no female has been hired on the English Department faculty since
1950. This information is summarized in Table I.
The restricted employment opportunities for women at this campus
is underscored by the fact that a significant percentage of the feminine
members of the faculty, especially those above the rank of assistant pro-
fessor were "inherited" as a result of the merger of Mather College for
Women and Adelbert College for Men when Western Reserve University
was formed two decades ago.
12 Testimony of Wilma Scott Heide, Hearings, Part I, at 132.
13 NATIONAL EDUCATION AsSOCIATION, SALARIES IN HIm EDUCATION, 1965-66. RESEARCH
REPORT 1966-R 2.
14 EDUCATION DmECTORY, 1969-1970, HIG-ER EDUCATION, NAT'L CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL
STATisTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF H.E.W., OFFICE OF EDuc.
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The posture of women at Ohio State University is strikingly similar.
They account for only 19 percent of the total faculty of 3004. While 36
percent of all instructors are female, their limited promotion potential is
shown by the fact that only 20 percent of assistant professors, 14 percent
of associate professors and 6 percent of professors are women.15 The
status of women by academic rank and department is depicted in Table
II on page 478. 0
An "in house" task force created to study the status of women at
Ohio State reported
Data indicated that women at The Ohio State University lacked
significant representation in most major areas throughout the Uni-
versity. While women comprised 38% of the total work force, they
did not have equal status with men at all levels and in all realms of
University activity. This problem was observed to be particularly
acute in such areas as top level administrative and professional posts
and in the instructional and research staff. Evidence showed that
women were under-represented in these areas and, in general, held
positions with little power involving critical decision-making. 16
This view was enhanced by the fact that at The Ohio State Uni-
versity as of February 1, 1971, there were no women serving in
positions of Vice Presidents or Deans, or in any of the top adminis-
trative policy making positions. 17
[Concerning faculty salaries], in summary, for twenty within
departmental comparisons women were paid lower salary in every
instance.18
Neither enlightened university leadership nor private pressures have
succeeded in enlarging the role of women in higher education. The fail-
ure of voluntarism means that if women are to be assured equal employ-
15 REPORT OF THE OHIO STATE UNIVERsrTY AD Hoc COMM. ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN 68
(1971).
16 Id. at 83.
17 Id. at 87.
18 Id., Supp., J, K, L-3. Comparable studies undertaken at a number of other insti-
tutions reaching similar conclusions are reported in Hearings, Parts I, II. E.g., Univ.
of California (Berkley) 1143; Univ. of Illinois, 1225; Univ. of Maryland, 1024; Univ.
of Chicago, 753.
20 CLEV. ST. L. R. (3) Sept. 1971
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ment opportunity in higher education it must come as a result of govern-
ment sanction.
In the succeeding pages we will explore three possible remedies
which may be pursued to end sexist policies on our nation's campuses:
1. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and counterpart state
Fair Employment Practices legislation;
2. The Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1866;
and
3. The federal contract compliance program.
Equal Employment Opportunity Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
State Fair Employment Practice Acts.
For women, Magna Carta properly dates from 1964 rather than 1215.
In that year, the Civil Rights Act declared as a matter of national policy
that discrimination in employment against an individual on account of
sex was unlawful.' 9
Unhappily, however, the act does not apply either to educational
institutions "with respect to the employment of individuals to perform
work connected with the educational activities of such institution[s]" 20
or to state and municipal universities with respect to the employment of
all individuals regardless of the nature of their work.21 Although
amendments seeking to close these loopholes have been introduced,2 2 at
this writing higher education remains one of the last major bastions
where male supremacist practices, at least in the area of faculty selec-
tion, can continue to operate within the law. The act is not, however,
totally without application to university employment. Arguably, the non-
teaching administrative and professional staff of private colleges still fall
within its penumbra. The legislative history offers no clues as to the
scope of the "educational activities" exclusion and there are thus far no
judicial interpretations of it. One author suggests that because no
"strictly objective standard for appointment, granting of tenure, and ad-
vancement can be enunciated," Congress believed the judgments exer-
cised with regard to faculty personnel actions must, of necessity, be
"delicate" and not readily subject to evaluation for bias.28 Yet, it is
questionable whether the judgments are any more subjective or sensitive
than in the case of other professionals and managers who are not so ex-
empted under the act.
19 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (e) et seq. (1964). See, L. KANowrrz, WOMEN AND THE LAW 103-6
(1968). The Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1) (1964), amends the Fair
Labor Standards Act to require that covered employees receive equal pay for equal
work regardless of sex. However, both the act and the counterpart legislation in
two-thirds of the states exempt administrative, executive and professional personnel.
20 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1964). Just how the educational exemption came to have
been incorporated in the act remains an enigma. There is no legislative history on
the subject and the passage first appears in The Dirksen-Mansfield sponsored Sub-
stitute for the House-passed version of the Act. H.R. 7152, amendment No. 656, May
26, 1964, Senate Calendar 854 at 74. Precedent may be found, however, in some ante-
cedent state Fair Employment Practices Acts.
21 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (b) (1964).
22 E.g. H.R. 16098, § 805, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1970).
23 Benewitz, Coverage Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 17 LABoa L. J. 285,
290-91 (1966).
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An alternate hypothesis might be advanced that the exclusion was
designed to avoid interference in the operations of "single sex" colleges
and in the teaching of physical education classes where pupils and
instructors are traditionally sex-segregated. In the absence of a definitive
rationale, it would appear inappropriate to interpret the exclusion
broadly.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, responsible for
administering the act,24 has thus far viewed the exclusion narrowly by
asserting jurisdiction over the complaint of an office manager in the ad-
missions office of a private university that her wages were discriminato-
rily lower than males holding equivalent positions,25 the similar charge
of a "Director of Study and Data Gathering" responsible for the assembly
and interpretation of data for use in program development and leadership
training at a church-related college26 and the complaint of a non-profes-
sional library assistant27 despite assertions from each of the responding
institutions that the "pedagogical exclusion" barred Commission action.
The effectiveness of the agency proceeding, where it is available, is
another matter. The rigid time limitations built into the act require a
complainant to notify the EEOC within 90 days of the alleged discrimi-
natory action. 8 If a state or municipal agency has concurrent jurisdic-
tion over the charge the complainant is obliged to refer the matter first
to it and may not invoke the processes of the EEOC for 60 days there-
after.29 Finally, if neither the state commission nor the EEOC have been
successful in resolving the controversy, the complainant is empowered to
institute a civil action within 30 days after receipt of a letter-notice from
the EEOC.30 The Commission's authority is limited to efforts at con-
ciliation and persuasion3 ' and its toothless bite has admittedly handi-
capped its enforcement of the statutory policy with respect to the 11,000
sex discrimination charges which made up one quarter of its total
docket32 during the first four years of its existence.
The necessary commitment of substantial time and money to litiga-
tion, the expectably long delay between commencement and outcome,
33
24 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1964).
25 EEOC, Dec. No. 70-405 (Jan. 19, 1970), CCH EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES GUIDE 6106.
26 EEOC, Dec. No. 71-1102 (Dec. 31, 1970), CCH EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES GUIDE 16200.
27 EEOC, Case No. CH 68-2-539E (May 7, 1969), CCH EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES GUIDE
ff6126.
28 42 U.S.C. § 2000e 5(d) (1964). Where a state enforcement agency exists the charge
must be filed with the EEOC within 30 days after notice that the local agency has
ended its proceedings but not later than 210 days from the occurrence.
29 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (b) (1964).
80 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1964).
91 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (a) (1964).
32 Testimony of William H. Brown III, Chairman, Equal Employment Opportunity
Comm'n, Hearings Part II on H.R. 16098 Before the Special Subcomm. on Education,
Comm. on Education and Labor, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. at 623, 629 (1970) [hereinafter
referred to as Hearings, Part II].
8 The EEOC simply lacks capacity to process promptly the charges filed with it.
Investigations may begin about 5 months after a complaint has been filed and con-
ciliation efforts may drag out another year and a half. Hearings on Appropriations
for 1970 Before the Subcomm. on the Departments of State et al., of the House
Comm. on Appropriations, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4 at 384 (testimony of Chairman
(Continued on next page)
20 CLEV. ST. L. R. (3) Sept. 1971
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the uncertainty of a fully compensatory recovery 4 and the potential
endangering of one's career because of the disfavor with which a suit
against a university is generally received in the academic community
combine to discourage aggrieved individuals from pursuing their rights
in court. In only ten per cent of the approximately 8000 "reasonable
cause" cases in which EEOC conciliation was unsuccessful were suits
subsequently filed against respondent employers. 35
Although the Attorney General is authorized to bring an action
directly in the name of the government whenever the discrimination
takes the form of a "pattern or practice," 36 it was not until July, 1970,
that the first sex suit was filed, and, in view of the Department of Jus-
tice's restricted resources, this enforcement mechanism would seem to be
of limited vitality.
3 7
Turning from the federal act to consider state and local Fair
Employment Practice legislation, one finds no less bleak prospects to
redress sex discrimination in higher education. The agencies of only
26 states claim jurisdiction over both private and public universities
while the authority of 5 others is limited to private institutions.3 8 Fur-
(Continued from preceding page)
Alexander) (1969); Hearings on S. 2453 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate
Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 91st Cong., 1st Seass. (1969); Coleman, Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act: Four Years of Procedural Elucidation, 8 DuqrrsNE L. REv. 1,
14, (1970). Of course, a complainant may sixty days after the EEOC's investigatory
period begins, file a civil action without waiting for the administrative process to
run its course. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (e) (1964); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.25a (a) (1971) *. See
also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1964) (court has discretion to stay proceedings for an-
other 60 days if EEOC efforts are still in progress).
34 Appointment of counsel and award of counsel fees at the discretion of the court
are provided in 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e 5(e) and (k) (1964). Relief in the form of "affirm-
ative action" and back-pay is also available 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1964).
35 Hearings, Part If at 629.
36 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6 (a) (1964). The Department may intervene in private actions
as well. 42 U.S.C. § 2 000e-5 (e) (1964).
37 Hearings, Part 1I at 635-36; Developments in the Law: Employment Discrimination
and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HAav. L. REV. 1109, 1230-32 (1971).
38 States having agencies with jurisdiction over private and public colleges:
As'z. REv. STAr. ANN. §41.1461*; CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 80, art. 21-2(5); CoNN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. ch. 563 § 31-122(f); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 112.41(1)*; HAWAII REV. STAT.
tit. 21 § 378 (4); IDAHO CODE § 67-5902(6)*; IND. ANN. STAT. § 22-9-1-1; IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 105A2 (5) *; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1002(b) *; MD. ANN. CODE art. 49 B, §§ 17, 20 (edu-
cational activities exemption); ANN. LAWS or MASS. ch. 151B § 1.5; MICH. COMp. LAWS
ANN. § 423.302(b); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.01; ANN. MO. STAT. ch. 296 § 291.010(3)
(Vernons); REV. CODE OF MONT. tit. 64, ch. 3 § 64.302(a); REV. STAT. OF NEB., ch. 48,
art. 11, §48.1102(2); NEV. REV. STAT. ch. 613 §310.1; N. M. STAT. ANN, §4-33-2B*;
N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 292-5 (McKinney); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25 § 1101*; PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 43 § 954(b); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-35-2(5)*; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, sub. 6 § 495 (5);
REV. CODE OF WASH. § 49.60.040 (quare whether applicable to public employers); W.
VA. CODE ANN. ch. 5 art. 11 § 3d; WYo. STAT. ANN. ch. 13 § 27.258(2). * -see 1971
Supplement.
States having agencies with jurisdiction over private colleges only:
ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.300(3); CAL. LABOR CODE § 1413(g).10; N.H. REV. STAT. § 354-
A: 2 (5); N.J. STAT, ANN. tit. 10 § 5(e)*; ORE. REV. ST. § 659.010(6).
Several states have legislation requiring that women be paid "equal pay for
equal work." E.g.:
ARK. STAT. ANN. ch. 6 § 81-624; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48 § 4A; Ky. REV. STAT. § 337.420
(2); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26 § 628; N.D. CEr. CODE ch. 34-06.1'; OHIo REV. CODE
ANN. § 4111.17A; GEN. LAWS OF R.I. tit. 28-6-18; S.D. COMPILED LAws ANN. ch. 60-12
§ 15; CIVIL STAT. OF THE STATE OF TExAs ANN., tit. 117, art. 6825.
See Nat'l Conf. of Cornm'r's on Uniform State Laws' Model Anti-Discrimination
Act, 4 HARv. J. Lmrs. 212 (1967); Bonfield, State Civil Rights Statutes: Some Pro-
posals, 49 Iowa L. REv. 1067 (1964); Bonfleld, Substance of American Fair Employ-
ment Practices Legislation 1: Employers, 61 Nw. U. L. REv. 907 (1967).
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thermore, the record of achievement by state agencies leaves much to be
desired. Commentators and the EEOC itself have criticized local per-
formance as ineffective.39
Understaffed, underbudgeted and under pressure, agencies of the
states and their political subdivisions have not been able to play a major
role in ensuring equality of treatment for the professional woman in the
nation's universities.
Relief Under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of
1866 Against Employment Discrimination in Public Colleges and
Universities.
The command of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibiting a state
from denying to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws is implemented under the Civil Rights Act of 1866 which
affords an injured party a private remedy against "[e]very person who,
under color of any statute ... regulation ... or usage, of any State...
subjects . . . any citizen . . . to the deprivation of any rights ... secured
by the Constitution and laws. . . ." 0
Vindication of feminine rights thus far under this legislation has
met with something less than notable success. The difficulty has not
been with any lack of recognition that women are "persons" entitled
to "Equal Protection" but rather that sex, unlike race, has been thought
to constitute a permissible basis for differentation in legislative treat-
ment.41 The "single sex school" issue aside,4 2 however, there would
appear to be no rational basis to support a limitation upon the employ-
ment of women in public co-educational institutions of higher learning
and no such policy has been openly propounded. Proof of the requisite
invidious discrimination by state educational officials then becomes the
major concern of a section 1983 proceeding. Deliberations of faculty
recruitment and promotion committee members or of university em-
ployment officers are not likely to be fruitful sources of evidence of un-
equal treatment; much less are published personnel guidelines apt to
prove productive. The case usually will have to be made circumstantially
by examination of the recruitment, compensation, promotion and termi-
nation practices and procedures and their application to the claimant
personally or to the class she may attempt to represent.43 In litigation
39 See SovERN, LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL DIscRIMINATIoN IN EMPLOYMENT 92-95
(1966); Note, Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964: Present Operation and Proposals
for Improvement, 5 COLUM. J. LAW & SOCIAL PIOs., 1, 18 (1969); Developments in the
Law: Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84
HAny. L. REV. 1109, 1212-1216 (1971). See also, Barone, The Impact of Recent Devel-
opments in Civil Rights on Employers and Unions, 17 LABOR L. J. 413 (1966); Insti-
tutional Analysis of the Agencies Administering Fair Employment Practice Laws, 42
N.Y.U. L. REv. 823 (1967).
40 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
41 Mengelkoch v. Industrial Welfare Comm., 284 F. Supp. 950 (C.D. Cal. 1968), va-
cated, 393 U.S. 83 (1968) (California's protective legislation providing for maximum
hours of work for women not violative of equal protection as unreasonable classifi-
cation); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (Michigan statute restricting licens-
ing of females as bartenders valid).
42 See, e.g., Heaton v. Bristol, 317 S.W.2d 86 (Tex. Cir. App. 1958) cert. denied, 359
U.S. 230 (1959), cf. Kirstein v. University of Virginia, 309 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Va.
1970).
43 E.g. Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tele., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970): Dobbins v.
Local 212, International Bhd. of Electrical Workers, 292 F. Supp. 413 (S.D. Ohio 1968).
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involving race discrimination the requirements of a prima facie case
have been met by the plaintiff's introduction of statistical evidence from
which courts have inferred that the defendant had engaged in pro-
hibited conduct. The door was opened in a series of cases in which the
absence of Negroes from jury panels over an extended period of time
was taken as prima facie proof of a deliberate design to systematically
exclude them.4 4 This so called "rule of exclusion" was called into play
when it was shown that Negroes constituted a substantial segment of
the relevant population, that some were qualified for jury service but
that none was ever called. 45 Proof of inequality in the number of Negroes
selected, in itself, was not evidence of discrimination since "fairness
in selection has never been held to require proportional representa-
tion of races upon a jury." 46 The door opened wider in the challenge
to Macon County's voters' registration system mounted in Alabama v.
United States.4 7 There, it was established that although 83 percent of
the county population was Negro, less than 10 per cent of voting
age were registered to vote in contrast to virtually 100 percent of
eligible white citizens. Noting that "statistics often tell much, and
Courts listen," the circuit court held the disparity to be so great that it
"could not exist by chance alone" but was presumptively the product of
a conscious policy of racial discrimination in the administration of the
registration system.48 In both the jury impanelment and voter registra-
tion cases, selection procedures should have been "random and auto-
matic." Any statistically significant discrepancy between the proportion
of qualified members of the allegedly disfavored group and the propor-
tion enrolled from the assertedly preferred group would thus suggest
that discriminatory forces were at work.49 This neat statistical inference
from population data may be inappropriate, however, in an employ-
ment setting, where the modifying elements of personal qualification
and interest in the job play a predominant role. 0 Nevertheless, one
court has held that a showing of such a statistical difference was conclu-
sive of discriminatory hiring practices"' while another was at least willing
to give it weight as "some indication that discriminatory forces, albeit
subtle ones, may be afoot." 52 Amassing evidence of sexist personnel
44 E.g., Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398 (1945).
45 Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478 (1954).
46 Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 403 (1945); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 208-9
(1965).
47 304 F.2d 583, 586 (5th Cir.), aff'd per curiam, 371 U.S. 37 (1962).
48 Id. at 586; accord, White v. Crook, 251 F. Supp. 401, 406 (M.D. Ala. 1966).
40 Penn v. Stumpf, 308 F. Supp. 1238 (N.D. Cal. 1970). See also Davis v. Cook, 80 F.
Supp. 443, 451 (N.D. Ga. 1948) (disparity between wages received by white and negro
teachers attributed to discrimination). But see, Reynolds v. Board of Public Instruc-
tion, 148 F.2d 754 (5th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 746 (1945).
50 Id. at 1243. See e.g., Developments in the Law: Employment Discrimi ation and
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARv. L. REV. 1109, 1152-1155 (1971);
Note, An American Dilemma-Proof of Discrimination, 17 U. Cm. L. REv. 107, 120-125
(1949).
51 Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970).
52 Penn. v. Stumpf, 308 F. Supp. 1238, 1243 (N.D. Cal. 1970); cf. Monroe v. Board of
Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450 (1968); United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 415 F.2d 1038 (5th
Cir. 1969); United States v. United Ass'n of Journeymen, 314 F. Supp. 160 (S.D. Ind.
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policies in the filling of administrative posts poses no greater challenge
in higher education than it does in industrial employment, and the
groundwork has already been laid for the proving of discrimination
in faculty hirings in a number of studies presented to the Office of
Federal Contract Compliance for action under Executive Order No.
11246,r s as amended, by Executive Order No. 11375.54 At a time when
universities are experiencing a financial pinch and enrollment pres-
sures appear to have crested, sex discrimination takes on a new
dimension for women currently employed in higher education. They
are vulnerable targets under "cut-back and attrition programs" either
because they lack seniority in staff jobs or because they lack tenure
in academic posts. Yet, section 1983 may provide them with a special
protection. Thereunder a public educational institution having a history
of racially discriminatory employment practices may not terminate the
services of an academic employee for economic reasons where the em-
ployee is a member of the class against whom the discrimination oper-
ated, even though the employee's services were otherwise terminable at
will and even though the termination was effected pursuant to a non-
discriminatory procedure. In such a case the school is required to afford
the teacher an opportunity to have his qualifications comparatively
evaluated according to objective standards and procedures against those
of all employees performing similar functions to determine which in-
structors are to be retained. 55
In Smith v. Board of Education,55" mandated integration of a segre-
gated school district had led to the closing of formerly all Negro schools.
When there were no longer vacancies at the remaining schools, unab-
sorbed teachers of the closed schools were, in accordance with traditional
practice, dismissed. Holding that "standards of placement cannot be
given application to preserve an existing system of imposed segregation,"
the court enjoined enforcement of the school board's "consolidation
policy... where the effect is to impose... the heavy burden of unem-
ployment solely upon those whose rights were violated....
Although we are presently concerned with discrimination which is
sex-linked rather than race related, no constitutional difference arises;
(Continued from preceding page)
1969). See also, Cameron Iron Works, Inc. v. Equal Employment Opportunity
Comm'n, 320 F. Supp. 1191 (S.D. Tex. 1970) (showing that less than 1% of the Com-
pany's white collar workers were black and less than 2% were Mexican-Americans
was sufficient to warrant order granting Commission's motion for production of com-
pany documents). But cf. Lewis v. City of Grand Rapids, 356 F.2d 276, 789-90 (6th
Cir.) cert. denied, 385 U.S. 838 (1966); United States v. Local 36, Sheet Metal Work-
ers Int'l Ass'n, 280 F. Supp. 719, 728-29 (E.D. Mo. 1968).
53 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965). See Hearings-Part H at p. 1261 for a list of the univer-
sities which have been the subject of such evaluative studies or formal complaints.
54 3 C.F.R. 320 (1967). See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Supp. V, 1970).
55 Smith v. Board of Educ., 365 F.2d 770 (8th Cir. 1966).
55a Id.
56 Accord, Rolf v. County Bd. of Ed., 391 F.2d 77 (6th Cir. 1968); Hill v. Franklin
County Bd. of Educ., 390 F.2d 583 (6th Cir. 1968); Wall v. Stanly County Bd. of Educ.,
378 F.2d 275 (4th Cir. 1967); Chambers v. Hendersonville City Bd. of Educ., 364 F.2d
189 (4th Cir. 1966).
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the Fourteenth Amendment speaks equally against violations of the
rights of women.5 7
If it can be shown that a public university has followed a settled
policy of discrimination against women in employment which has re-
sulted in female professionals being the last hired, the first fired and
the most overlooked in promotions, any member of the class against
whom this discrimination has operated would appear entitled to claim
the right of having her qualifications comparatively evaluated against
all the members of the institution similarly situated to determine who
will be affected by an economic cut-back.
Section 1983 is available, of course, only where the complained of
sex discrimination constitutes "state action." 58 Clearly within its ambit
are the state and municipal universities. There is also, however, a
growing body of judicial opinion and academic comment holding that
even an ostensibly private educational institution operating under
state charter, license and regulation, carrying out an important public
function, benefitting from state tax exemption and receiving state funds
so involves the state in its activities that, at least where discrimination
is alleged, the institution's acts are those of the state.59
57 Seidenberg v. MeSorley's Old Ale House, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 1253 (S.D.N.Y. 1969);
Kirstein v. University of Virginia, 309 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Va. 1970). But cf. Williams
v. McNair, 316 F. Supp. 134 (D.S.C. 1970).
Courts are divided over whether actions arguably cognizable under Title VII
must be brought under the procedure specified in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 rather
than pursuant to §§ 1983 and 1981 of the 1866 Act. Compare James v. Ogilvie, 310
F. Supp. 661 (N.D. Ill. 1970) and Young v. Int'l Tel. and Tel. Co., 438 F.2d 757 (3rd
Cir. 1971) with Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l Harvester Co., 427 F.2d 476
(7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 911 (1971).
58 United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n. 7 (1966).
59 Hammond v. University of Tampa, 344 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1965).
Cf. "Tuition Grant" cases: Poindexter v. Louisiana Financial Assistance Comm.,
275 F. Supp. 833 (E.D. La., 3-judge, 1967), afl'd per curian, 389 U.S. 571 (1968); C. A.
Brown v. South Carolina State Bd. of Ed., 296 F. Supp. 199 (D.S.C. 3-judge, 1968),
aff'd per curiam, 393 U.S. 222 (1968); Griffin v. State Bd. of Ed., 296 F. Supp. 1178
(1969).
See also, Pennsylvania v. Brown, 270 F. Supp. 782 (E.D. Pa. 1967) aff'd, 392 F.2d
120 (3rd Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 921; Guillory v. Tulane University, 203
F. Supp. 855 (E.D. La.), vacated, 207 F. Supp. 554, af'd, 306 F.2d 489 (5th Cir.),
rev'd on retrial, 212 F.Supp. 674 (1962). Seidenberg v. McSorley's Old Ale House,
Inc., 308 F. Supp. 1253 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) James v. Ogilvie, 310 F. Supp. 661 (N.D. Ill.
1970); Ethridge v. Rhodes, 268 F. Supp. 83 (S.D. Ohio 1967); Dobbins v. Local 212,
International Bhd. of Electrical Workers, 292 F. Supp. 413 (S.D. Ohio 1968); Kerr v.
Enoch Pratt Free Library, 149 F.2d 212 (4th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 721
(1945); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Meredith v.
Allen County War Memorial Hosp. Comm'n, 397 F.2d 33 (6th Cir. 1968); Steele v.
Louisville & N.R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
But cf. "Students Rights" cases: Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73 (2nd Cir. 1968);
Counts v. Voorhees College, 312 F. Supp. 598 (D.S. C. 1970); McLeod v. College of
Artesia, 312 F. Supp. 498 (D.N.M. 1970); Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia University,
287 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Browns v. Mitchell, 409 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1969);
Bright v. Isenbarger, 314 F. Supp. 1382 (N.D. Ind. 1970).
See, Note Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HAy. L. REV. 1045,
1056-65 (1967-68); Note, 'State Action' and Private Universities, 44 TULANE L. REV.
184 (1969-70); Note, Private Government on Campus-Judicial Review of University
Expulsions, 72 YALE L. REV. 1362, 1381-1386 (1963); Note, An Overview: The Private
University and Due Process, 1970 DUKE L. JOURNAL 795; Comment, Student Due Proc-
ess in the Private University: The State Action Doctrine, 20 SYRACUSE L. RrV. 911
(1969); Cohen, "The Private-Public Legal Aspects of Institutions of Higher Educa-
tion." 45 DENvRa L. REv. 643 (1968); O'Neil, Private Universities and Public Law, 19
BUFFALO L. REV. 155 (1970); Schubert, State Action and the Private University, 24
RUraEs L. REv. 323 (1969-70).
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Yet, without further elasticizing of the "state action" concept, it is
foreseeable that numbers of presently independent colleges will enter the
public domain as economic considerations impel them to seek the public
purse.
Even when the educationally sponsored discrimination is labeled
"private," one may speculate whether it might still be reachable under
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, as reenacted, through present section 1981
which provides:
All persons . . . shall have the same right in every State . . . to
make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citi-
zens .... 60
A line of cases has held that the Act reaches racial discrimination
in private employment consistently with Congress' power to enforce the
Thirteenth Amendment."1 But women have also been subjected to a
form of "involuntary servitude" in the nature of state imposed dis-
abilities,"2 and it is not entirely frivolous to suggest that the removal of
the "badges and incidents" of their quasi-chattel status is within the am-
bit of the Act.
While the protection of Negro rights was undoubtedly the motif of
the legislation one court has found that the sweep of the provision is
broad enough to encompass the safeguarding of the rights of white citi-
zens against interference by black.68 If, without doing violence to the
statutory concept, we can infer that the rights conferred by section 1981
upon "all persons" were those enjoyed by "white male citizens," then the
predicate may be formed for asserting the protection of the statute on
behalf of women victimized by discrimination in private university em-
ployment.
The "Affirmative Action" Approach to Promoting Equal Employment
Opportunity in Higher Education for Women Through the Federal Con-
tract Compliance Program.
The twin problems of proof of violation and adequacy of remedy as-
sociated with the adjudicatory approach to sex discrimination inherent
in the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1964 have, to a significant degree,
been finessed in the contrasting regulatory scheme for the promotion of
equal opportunity embodied in the federal contract compliance pro-
gram.
Under Executive Order No. 1124664 as amended by Executive Order
No. 1137565 all federal contracting agencies are mandated to include in
60 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1965).
01 Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l Harvester Co., 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir.
1970), cert. denied 400 U.S. 911 (1971); Dobbins v. Local 212, I.B.E.W., 292 F. Supp. 413
(S.D. Ohio 1968), Cf. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 39 U.S.L.W. 4688 (U.S. Sup. Ct. June 7,
1971) (§ 1985[3]); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (§ 1982); United
States v. Medical Society of S.C., 298 F. Supp. 145, 152 (D. S.C. 1969); Young v.
Int'l Tel. & Tel. Co., 438 F.2d 757 (3rd Cir. 1971); Sanders v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 431
F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1970).
62 See generally L. KYowrrz, supra note 19.
63 Central Presbyterian Church v. Black Liberation Front, 303 F. Supp. 894 (E.D. Mo.
1969).
64 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965); 42 U.S.C. §2000e (Supp. V, 1970).
" 3 C.FR. 320 (1967).
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government contracts provisions whereby the contractors, for themselves
and their subcontractors, agree "not [to] discriminate against any em-
ployee or applicant for employment because of . . . sex" and to "take
affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed and that em-
ployees are treated... without regard to their... sex." 66 Responsibility
for the enforcement of the program has been delegated by the Secretary
of Labor to the Office of Federal Contract Compliance,67 which, in turn,
has sub-delegated major compliance functions for education to the De-
partment of Health, Education and Welfare's Office of Civil Rights.("
This year the Office is mandated to perform "reviews" on at least half
of the facilities within its jurisdiction, 0 and, before the award, on
every institution receiving a contract in excess of $1,000,000.7
Establishments entering into contracts calling for payment of more
than $50,000 are required to submit detailed affirmative action plans out-
lining the procedures they will follow to end discriminatory employ-
ment practices and increase the representation of underutilized minority
employees."' A formidable array of sanctions ranging from publicizing
non-compliance to cancellation of existing awards and debarment from
bidding on future contracts may be visited upon contractors failing to
meet compliance standards. 2 With $3,367,000,000 of non-substitutable
federal funds at stake annually, 73 some 2100 institutions of higher edu-
cation are peculiarly sensitive to the imperatives of the Executive Order
program. Yet the full potential of contract compliance as a means of
promoting equal opportunity for professional women at our universities
has not yet been realized. 74
Three impediments need to be removed. The first of these is the
lack of specific guidelines for educational institutions as to the content
of affirmative action programs for elimination of sex discrimination in
faculty and professional employment. To be sure, the OFCC has pro-
mulgated sex discrimination regulations useful in the typical industrial
setting75 but most of these-e.g., including women in management train-
ing programs, designing advertising to indicate that women will be con-
sidered equally with men for jobs-are not very meaningful in the uni-
versity personnel process.
66 3 C.F.R. 321 (1967). The governors of 9 states have issued similar executive
orders, viz., Ala., Cal., Conn., Ill., N.J., Ohio, Utah, Wash., W. Va.
67 31 Fed. Reg. 6921 (1966).
68 Compliance Agency Responsibility, OFCC Order No. 1 § 2b, 2 CCH EMPLOYMENT
PRACTICES GUIDE 17,650 (Oct. 24, 1969). 15 contracting agencies have been given ju-
risdiction over specific industries pursuant to Standard Industrial Classification Codes
designations. 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.6 (1970).
69 Id. at § 2d.
70 35 Fed. Reg. 10,660 (1970), amending 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.20(d) (1970).
71 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.40 (1970).
72 3 C.F.R. 343-344 (1964-65), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Supp. V, 1970). These actions may
be taken by the Office of Civil Rights only with the approval of the OFCC, 41 C.F.R.
§ 60-1.27 (1970).
Courts have refused to imply a private right of action for violation of the con-
tractual pledge not to discriminate. Farkas v. Texas Instruments, 375 F.2d 629 (5th
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1968).
73 Hearings, Part I at 3.
74 Nash, Affirmative Action Under Executive Order 11,246, 46 N.Y.U. L. REv. 225, 231
(1971); Developments in the Law, supra note 37 at 1286-1289.
75 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-20.1-60-20.6 (1971).
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The general orders governing employment policies of non-construc-
tion contractors toward minority groups' 6 require, as part of an accept-
able affirmative action program,77 "an analysis of areas within which the
contractor is deficient in the utilization of minority groups and . . .goals
and timetables to which the contractor's good faith efforts must be direct-
ed to correct the deficiencies .... ," 78 Minorities are said to be "under-
utilized" in any job category in which the number of members employed
is fewer than would reasonably be expected by their availability.79 While
the OFCC steadfastly denies that its guidelines countenance "compen-
satory hiring" or "employment quotas," 80 it does insist that "[w]here de-
ficiencies exist and where numbers or percentages are relevant in devel-
oping corrective action, the contractor shall establish ... specific goals
and timetables" which should be reasonably attainable in light of the
deficiencies and his "good faith efforts to make his overall affirmative
action program work." 81
Specific numerical goals, expressed as percentages of each job
category to be reached within given time periods, have been established
on the basis of objective factors for the construction industry.12 Failure
to meet these targets constitutes evidence of discrimination, shifting to
the contractor the burden of going forward on the question of com-
pliance.8 3 Apparently, however, the government retains the ultimate
burden of showing that the contractor has not complied through lack of
good faith efforts to achieve the set goals.84 Although "merit based"
hiring and promotion, presupposing neutrality of treatment, has been ex-
pressed to be the guiding principle, 9 the Solicitor to the Department of
Labor has suggested that the contractor, "should strive to create the situ-
ation which would have prevailed in his establishment if not for the long
history of discrimination against minorities by industry and society." 86
One may well question whether such a situation is either knowable or
achievable, but attempts to create it are likely to involve, at least for
the short term, a "compensatory" hiring and promotion system favoring
minority group candidates disproportionately to their numbers thereby
76 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-2.1--60-2.31 (1971) (OFCC Order No. 4).
77 "An affirmative action program is a set of specific and result oriented procedures
to which a contractor commits himself to apply every good faith effort." 41 C. F. R.
§ 60-2.10 (1971).
78 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.10 (1971).
79 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.11(a) (1971).
80 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-2.24(e), 60-2.30 (1971), cf. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (employer not
required to grant preferred treatment to any group on account of "imbalance" in
number of members of such group employed).
81 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.11 (b) (1971).
82 E.g., 41 C.F.R. § 60-5.11 (1971) ("Washington Plan"); Contractors Ass'n v. Secre-
tary of Labor, 311 F. Supp. 1002 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
83 41 C.F.R. § 60-5.21 (f) (1971).
84 Id. cf. 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.30 (1971).
85 See Developments in the Law: Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HAnv. L. REv. 1109, 1300-01 (1971); 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.30
(1971).
86 P. G. Nash, Afilrmative Action Under Executive Order 11,246, 46 N.Y.U. L. REv.
225, 257 (1971).
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colliding with the policies of Title VII.87 While Title VII has limited
application to institutions of higher education,8 8 there would seem to be
no need for affirmative action sex guidelines to sanction such "reverse
discrimination." Short of this effective content can be supplied by re-
quiring universities to take a number of steps to rid themselves of prac-
tices which bias the employment processes and give practical effect to
their professed commitment to equal opportunity regardless of sex. For
purposes of the present survey the major elements of such a program
can be briefly stated:
1. Elimination of informal "quota" restrictions in admission of wo-
men to undergraduate, graduate and professional schools and sub-
stitution of a policy of admission of females on the basis of competitive
scholastic achievement.
2. Formulation and implementation of a plan for the active re-
cruitment of women for both undergraduate and graduate schools with
special emphasis upon encouraging women to enter traditionally male
oriented professions.
3. Review of scholarship and financial aid programs to assure their
availability to women, regardless of marital or parental status, and the
adequacy of participation by women in the total of such awards.
4. Removal of age barriers in both admissions and financial assist-
ance policies so as to encourage married women to resume their educa-
tion as soon as their parental commitments permit them to do so, and,
in this connection, establishment of child day care centers.
5. Expansion of student counselling and job placement services to
accommodate the special needs of women.
6. Modification of any "nepotism" rules so as to restrict their oper-
ation to cases where the terms of employment, advancement or standards
of conduct of one employee would be effectively subject to the authority
of another related by blood or marriage.
7. Provision of adequate "maternity leave" time without loss of em-
ployment status or academic standing.
8. Payment of starting salaries and future increases according to
clearly defined objective criteria consistently applied. When it is shown
that the average compensation paid to women staff or faculty members
is significantly less than that paid to men of equal rank and service in
any appropriate class, the university should have the burden of present-
ing evidence indicating that the disparity is not the result of sex dis-
crimination.
9. Placement of at least one woman on each recruitment, promotion
and tenure committee according to an acceptable timetable.
10. Appointment of women to faculty and staff positions in accord-
ance with specific numerical goals and timetables designed to result in
a level of representation at the institution in each appropriate employ-
ment classification commensurate with the proportion of qualified women
available in the relevant job market.
11. Creation of an effective internal administrative mechanism to
(a) review university employment for adequacy of representation of
87 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a) (1964).
88 See text at notes 20-27, supra.
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women (b) investigate apparent disparities and inequities (c) appraise
existing systems and procedures for making the admission, recruitment,
financial aid, hiring, promotion and tenure decisions, in terms of their
freedom from sex-bias and (d) recommend additional steps for assuring
full equality of employment opportunity for women.
The second barrier to realization of the potential of the federal con-
tract compliance program as a means of ending sex discrimination on the
campus is the familiar one of inadequate agency resources in light of the
agency mission.
At this time approximately 45 stff members of the HEW's office of
Civil Rights, divided between Washington and 10 regional centers, carry
the responsibility for investigating the compliance status of institutions
of higher education.8 9
The Chicago Regional office whose jurisdiction extends to private
and public colleges in the states of Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota,
Ohio and Wisconsin has had only one investigator to perform scheduled
compliance reviews and investigate complaints.9
As this article is being prepared only two college affirmative action
programs-those of Harvard and Tufts-attempting to provide equal em-
ployment opportunities for women have been approved although many
elements in other submitted plans may be acceptable. Furthermore, the
absence of a central clearing house and information exchange system has
resulted in a lack of coordination and uniformity of approach among the
regional headquarters so that there is no assurance that a college devel-
oped program deemed satisfactory by one branch will be similarly viewed
by another."'
The need for an increased budget to hire additional investigators
and the establishment of an inter-office communications network are
understood by the agency 92 and progress to remedy these problems can
be expected. However, there seems to be little doubt that universities
take advantage of the limited staff available to enforce OFCC guidelines
to drag their feet in the development of adequate affirmative action pro-
grams.93 The efforts of the staff to achieve compliance could be material-
ly assisted by focusing the force of public opinion upon recalcitrant insti-
tutions.9 4 Unfortunately, however, the Department takes the position
that its "letters of findings" and the university's responses thereto are
confidential and unavailable to the public under the Public Information
89 Telephone interview with Mrs. Rose Block, Senior Contract Compliance Specialist,
Office of Civil Rights, Department of Health, Education and'Welfare, Washington,
D. C., on May 27, 1971.
90 Telephone interview with Mr. Don Scott, Acting Branch Chief, Chicago, Office of
Civil Rights, Department of Health, Education and Welfare on June 10, 1971. Some
30 complaints over alleged sex discrimination at 20 institutions have been received
by this office. Reviews under the sex guidelines have been undertaken in the Chi-
cago region at 7 universities-Wisconsin, Pittsburgh, Michigan, Notre Dame, Loyola
of Chicago, Illinois and John Carroll.
91 Id. The progress reports thus far filed by Harvard and Tufts have not been
deemed satisfactory.
92 Telephone interview with Mrs. Rose Block, supra note 89.
93 Telephone interview with Mr. Don Scott, supra note 90.
94 d.
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Act as "investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes" there-
by introducing a third obstacle in the path of the agency mission.95
There would appear to be little justification for so classifying these docu-
ments9" and perhaps a pending review of Department policy in this re-
gard will overturn the restriction.
With all its limitations, it seems certain that the federal contract
compliance program will in the near term prove to be a powerful instru-
ment for reforming currents of rampant sexist employment practices in
higher education.
95 Telephone interview with Mr. Robert Smith, Acting Director, Public Affairs Di-
vision, Office of Civil Rights, Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Wash-
ington, D. C., on June 15, 1971. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. III 1968), 45 C.F.R. § 5.77
(1971).
96 Bristol-Myers Co. v. F.T.C., 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
824 (1970).
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